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INTRODUCTION
The topic of this symposium issue addresses the state of con-
tract law in the year 2025, but it raises the question: What does it
mean to enter into a contract today? Contract law presumes a
certain paradigmatic scenario where two equally sophisticated
parties negotiate terms to achieve a mutually beneficial bargain.
This paradigmatic scenario has given way to contracts in a variety
of forms, presented in different ways, and serving various func-
tions. They can be paper or digital; they can be negotiated or ad-
hesive. Contracts occupy different roles in a transaction, the mar-
ketplace, and society. They can be used to plan complex transac-
tions between multinational corporations, but they can also be
used to establish codes of conduct on a social networking site.
Does contract law adequately respond to the needs of today's soci-
ety? If not, how can it be expected to meet the needs of society in
2025?
Contract law's past portends its future. Technology has provid-
ed the impetus for many of the changes to contracts and contract
law. Technological innovation has created new legal issues re-
garding business practices. Businesses have attempted to address
these issues and reduce uncertainty and risk through private or-
dering. Technology has also enabled new forms of contracting and
made it easier to engage in transactions and commercial relation-
ships across great distances and time zones. Formerly the prov-
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. The author thanks Dr. John
Murray for the invitation to contribute to this symposium on contract law in 2025.
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ince of large corporations, today even sole proprietors may engage
in international business transactions thanks to the Internet and
other advancements.
Part I of this essay examines how businesses have shaped the
evolution of contract's form from the past to the present and ex-
plains how courts have responded by reshaping contract law.'
Part II of this essay anticipates changes in the business landscape
and explains how these changes might create new challenges for
contract law. Part III predicts two alternative visions for contract
law in 2025. The first is as a diminished body of law, made nearly
irrelevant by other laws and preempted by private rules adminis-
tered by non-judicial entities. The second vision is that of a robust
contract law administered by courts that understand the diversity
of marketplace needs, acknowledge contracting realities, and con-
sider the context of transactions in applying doctrinal rules. This
essay concludes that the strength of contract law lies is in its flex-
ibility, but its relevance depends upon how courts use that flexibil-
ity to guide its development.
I. CONTRACTS AND MARKETPLACE CHANGES
Contracts play an important role in a market economy. They dif-
fer from other promises because they are legally enforceable, and
thus more reliable. Not surprisingly, the development of modern
contracts took place alongside the growing sophistication of a
market economy. As markets grew and became more competitive,
due in large part to the increased sophistication of machinery,
marketplace needs required the ability to engage in future plan-
ning.2 Parties required assurance of future performances. Com-
panies needed to project costs and predict sales in order to esti-
mate their future use of materials. Businesses needed credit to
purchase raw materials and equipment. Contracts encouraged
trust, which was essential to credit-based transactions. By provid-
ing needed assurance, contracts facilitated planning for future
events rather than limiting the parties to what they could present-
1. This section references and incorporates my prior work discussing contract's evolu-
tion in light of societal and marketplace changes. See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS:
FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013); Nancy S. Kim, Contract's Adaptation and the
Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327 (2011).
2. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.3, at 8 (4th ed. 2004) ("Producers ...
saw the need to plan for the future in order to compete with other producers. An exchange
of promises looking to a future exchange of performances would give a producer the basis
for predictable calculation . . , .").
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ly purchase or trade. The security provided by contracts also em-
boldened parties to enter into transactions with strangers. A
larger pool of trading partners provides more opportunities for
exchange and more possibilities for gain.4 In the absence of con-
tract, markets would have remained small and local. Contracts
permitted a shift from a primitive, barter economy to a more so-
phisticated, credit-based one.
In the transition from a barter economy to one based on credit, a
particular model of a contract emerged and flourished. Friedrich
Kessler depicts this model as one where "free bargaining" parties
are "brought together by the play of the market" and "meet each
other on a footing of social and approximate economic equality."'
Contract law developed in response to this model of a contract as a
private affair between two equals, and reflected free market prin-
ciples such as autonomous decision-making and freedom from ju-
'6dicial intervention.
Industrialization enabled the mass production of goods, which
eventually created a change in contract's form and contracting
method. Companies increased the efficiency of standard transac-
tions by standardizing terms in form contracts. Form contracts
also facilitated consumer credit, encouraging innovation and eco-
nomic growth. Goods, such as sewing machines and automobiles,
were too expensive for most consumers to purchase outright so
companies instituted installment payment plans.' Without cred-
it-and standard form contracts-the growth of new industries
would have stalled. Socially useful but costly products might have
failed as few consumers could afford to pay the total price at the
time of purchase.
3. Erin Ann O'Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for
Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1883, 1899 (2005) ("By expanding the pos-
sible trading partners for each person, contract law makes us all wealthier because it pro-
vides greater possible gains from exchange.").
4. Id.
5. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943).
6. Id. (stating that contracts as "the language of the cases tells us" are a "private af-
fair" and, therefore, the judicial system "provides only for their interpretation, but the
courts cannot make contracts for the parties.").
7. Id. at 631 (noting that large scale enterprise and mass production and distribution
made a "new type of contract inevitable-the standardized mass contract.").
8. LENDOL G. CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
CONSUMER CREDIT 162 (1999) (explaining how costly consumer goods led to the creation of
installment plans which in turn fueled the growth of industries producing these goods).
Summer 2014 305
Duquesne Law Review
Mass consumer form contracts were generally contracts of adhe-
sion, meaning that their terms were non-negotiable and the con-
sumer was made to agree to them on a "take it or leave it" basis.
Businesses used form contracts with other businesses as well as
consumers, but they did not use them in the same way. Form con-
tracts between two businesses generally were not adhesive, alt-
hough they were often unread.
Lawmakers and courts recognized that standard form contracts
differed from negotiated ones, and that the role of standard form
contracts in mass consumer transactions differed from their role
in business-to-business transactions. State legislatures enacted
special laws to regulate insurance and credit card contracts. They
also adopted versions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
which treats merchants differently from consumers. For example,
section 2-209 states that "no oral modification" clauses in con-
tracts are enforceable provided that, if the contract is between a
merchant and a non-merchant, the non-merchant needs to sepa-
rately initial that provision.' Section 2-207 of the UCC states that
additional terms in a form acceptance should be construed as
"proposals for addition"'o and if the transaction is between a mer-
chant and a non-merchant, these additional terms are not part of
the contract." Courts recognized that consumers often had no
bargaining power and that form contracts were easy to ignore and
difficult to understand. 12 They shaped contract law to take these
9. U.C.C. § 2-209 (2012).
10. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2012).
11. Id. Section 2-207 (2012) states:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless ac-
ceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants, such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a
reasonable time after notice of them is received.
See also JOSEPH M. PERRILLO, CALAMARI AND PERRILLO ON CONTRACTS, § 2.21, at 88-89
(6th ed. 2009)(stating that if the records form a contract, the additional or different terms
are treated as offers to modify the terms of the contract and "(i)f either party is a non-
merchant, the terms of the offer constitute the contract without modification. The one
exception is if the offeror expressly assents to the additional or different terms. The offe-
ror's silence will not normally be considered assent to the additional or different terms.").
12. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (striking down warranty dis-
claimer). In discussing Henningsen v. Bloomfield, Jay Feinman and Caitlin Edwards write
that "while not abandoning 'freedom of contract,' the court recognized the ubiquity of 'the
306 Vol. 52
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contracting realities into account, developing the doctrine of un-
conscionability,1 3 and rules governing interpretation and construc-
tion, such as the rule of contra proferentem,14 the reasonable com-
municativeness test," and the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions."
At the end of the last century, another major shift in the busi-
ness landscape created other changes in contracting form. The
advent of personal computers, digital information, and the Inter-
standardized mass contract' presented to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Other
courts had increasingly scrutinized the reasonableness of warranty disclaimers on claim
checks, parking lot leases, contracts between banks and their customers and flight insur-
ance policies." Jay M. Feinman & Caitlin Edwards, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.
(1960): Promoting Product Safety by Protecting Consumers of Defective Goods, in COURTING
JUSTICE: 10 NEW JERSEY CASES THAT SHOOK THE NATION 35, 45 (Paul L. Tractenberg ed.,
Nov. 5, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2364772.
Feinman and Edwards write that, as a result of Henningsen:
[The] vision of contract law changed . . . . The traditional approach to contracts envi-
sioned two independent individuals bargaining on an equal footing about contract
terms that would be to their individual advantage. In holding Chrysler's warranty
disclaimer ineffective, the court recognized that that conception no longer fit an econ-
omy of mass distribution .... The traditional model of bargaining no longer applied,
so rather than simply enforcing a contract, the court had to 'protect the ordinary man
against the loss of important rights through what, in effect, is the unilateral act of
the manufacturer.'
Id. at 53.
13. See Williams, 350 F.2d at 448-49 ("In other jurisdictions, it has been held as a mat-
ter of common law that unconscionable contracts are not enforceable. While no decision of
this court so holding has been found, the notion that an unconscionable bargain should not
be given full enforcement is by no means novel . . . . [Wie hold that where the element of
unconscionability is present at the time a contract is made, the contract should not be en-
forced."); U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2012) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.").
14. Contra proferentem means "against the offeror" and the technique, applied where
contract language is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations, adopts the meaning less
favorable in its legal effect to the party who chose the words. Margaret N. Kniffen, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS, Vol. 5, § 24.25 (1998). See also, e.g., Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv. v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 41 F.3d 1476, 1481 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that the application of
contra proferentem requires "ambiguities to be construed against the drafter of a docu-
ment").
15. See, e.g., Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 835-36 (9th Cir. 2002) (not-
ing that under the reasonable communicativeness test, a disincentive to study the provi-
sions of a cruise ticket is an extrinsic factor impeding the passenger's ability to become
"meaningfully informed."); see also Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Con-
tracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1309 (2005) (stating that "courts recognized the tradi-
tional cautionary function served by the signed paper contract and fashioned new rules to
account for the different signals sent to offerees by novel methods of contracting.").
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 211(3) (1981) ("Where the other party
has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew
that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.").
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net dramatically changed the marketplace. Technological advanc-
es brought with them unanswered questions about the viability of
business models and the risks associated with offering certain
goods and services." Software and digital information providers
were concerned that their products could be easily duplicated or
unfairly exploited. The development of software was costly, but
the end product could be easily copied and distributed. It was un-
clear whether software was protected by copyright. Furthermore,
software could be unpredictable and often contained "bugs" or
problems that impeded perfect operation. Content on one website
could be scraped and reposted on another website, frustrating the
original website's attempts to attract viewers and monetize infor-
mation. In addition, users might post unlawful information, sub-
jecting the website to copyright infringement or other liability.
Where the law was uncertain, companies tried to protect their
products and limit their liability by using contracts. The digital
era ushered in novel contracting forms such as the shrinkwrap,
the clickwrap, and the browsewrap, which companies presented to
consumers in ways intended to minimize transactional impedi-
ments." Courts generally upheld these wrap contracts" provided
that the contracts gave consumers notice and an opportunity to
reject terms.20 This meant that consumers would be deemed to
have consented to an agreement by clicking "accept" on an icon or
a "Terms of Use" hyperlink, even if the action was automatic and
they did not realize the legal effect of what they were doing.
The low cost and ease with which digital contracts can be dupli-
cated, and the proliferation of digital devices, have made contracts
ubiquitous in today's society. Contracts govern nearly all online
activity. They also regulate offline activity between businesses
17. For a more detailed discussion, see KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 17-30.
18. Shrinkwraps are agreements encased in plastic wrap that typically accompany
software compact discs. Because they are contained within the product packaging, the
consumer does not have an opportunity to review terms prior to purchase. Clickwraps and
browsewraps are digital agreements. A clickwrap requires clicking agreement in some
manner, such as on an "accept" box. A browsewrap is a hyperlink that is designated as an
agreement by the words "Terms of Use" or similar language. Id. at 3.
19. I use the term "wrap contracts" to refer to a unilaterally imposed set of terms which
the drafter purports to be legally binding and which the recipient does not sign with a pen
to acknowledge assent. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 2.
20. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding the
terms of browsewrap); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
a contract that was received after sale was completed); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC,
732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding a forum selection clause in an
agreement contained in a scroll box that required a click).
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and consumers. They often contain surprising and unfair terms.
With print adhesive contracts, companies routinely impose man-
datory arbitration, limitations of liability, and disclaimers of war-
ranty. Wrap contracts include these and even more oppressive
terms, such as the extraction of rights to user created content and
to user personal information, unilateral modification clauses,21
and even the curtailment of free speech rights.22
The pervasiveness of contracts and the resultant consumer ha-
bituation to them means that consumers fail to read or even notice
them. Consumers object to being hijacked by contracts that are
dense and impenetrable. Academics raise concerns about the de-
letion of important rights by form contract2 3 and the inability of
consumers to accurately assess information necessary to proper
decision making.2 4 Legislators have responded to some of these
problems by implementing laws that address contractual abuses,
such as the Credit CARD Act,25 which includes disclosure re-
quirements designed to counter the obscure terms in lengthy cred-
it card agreements. The American Law Institute, too, has re-
sponded by undertaking a new project, Restatement of the Law
Third, Consumer Contracts, which focuses on consumer contracts
21. For a discussion of oppressive terms commonly contained in digital contracts, see
KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 44-69; Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Un-
wrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from
Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2011).
22. For example, one website states:
You agree not to file or initiate any complaint, chargeback, dispute, public comment,
forum post, website post, social media post, or any claim related to any transaction
with our website and/or company. By using our website, making any purchase, or
conducting any transaction with us, you agree to all terms and conditions stated
herein.... You agree that any breach of this agreement shall also constitute liability
in the amount of $200 plus any related costs directly or indirectly relating from any
such breach.
Terms and Conditions, ACCESSORY TOWN, http://acctown.com/pages/terms (last visited
March 24, 2014). Another company allegedly claimed that its customer had violated a non-
disparagement clause in its terms of service assessed a $3500 fine for violation of its terms
of service, and reported non-payment of the fine to credit reporting agencies. See Susannah
Kim, Utah Couple Fined $3,500 by Online Merchant KlearGear Retains Lawyer, Turns
Tables, ABC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/couple-fined-3500-
writing-negative-review/story?id=21018224.
23. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE (2012); see also Zev J. Eigen, The Devil is
in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form Adhesive
Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381, 387 (2008) (arguing that the frequency of contracting may
result in society's collective notion of contract being "watered-down").
24. See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT (2012).
25. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-1667f (2014).
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and consumer protection law.2 6 Courts, by contrast, have been
less responsive to consumers' claims of abuse by contracts than
they have been in the past.27 Most courts adhere to a mechanistic
application of post-ProCD precedent, 28 where a click constitutes a
manifestation of assent and the barrage of multi-page contracts
has no bearing on a consumer's so-called "duty to read."
If history is any indication, the judiciary's failure to remedy con-
tractual abuse may spur action in different quarters. Regulators
such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) tend to step up their
enforcement efforts when courts enforce contracts that permit
what policy discourages.29 For example, judicial enforcement of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in form contracts has raised con-
cern among legislators, consumer advocates, and regulators. Ac-
cordingly, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has
26. See Current Projects, Restatement Third, The Law of Consumer Contracts, A.L.I.,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfin?fuseaction=projects.proj-ip&projectid=25 (last visited Mar. 14,
2014).
27. I provide an extensive critique of recent court cases enforcing wrap contracts
against consumers in a book. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 1. Cases include Briceftio
v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So.2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding arbitration
clause in updated terms of use); A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC., 544 F.Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va.
2008), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom A.V. ex. rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562
F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) (enforcing terms of use against minors); Scherillo v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 684 F.Supp. 2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (upholding online agreement against plain-
tiff who did not remember reading terms). There have been a few heartening exceptions to
this trend. See Clark v. Renaissance West, LLC, 307 P.3d 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (finding
an arbitration agreement unconscionable); In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, No. 13-MD-
02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal Sept. 26, 2013) (interpreting Google's online
agreement to limit its ability to access user emails).
28. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit
ruled that a finding of assent did not require that the consumer have the opportunity to
review terms prior to purchase but merely have an opportunity to return the purchased
item after having an opportunity to review the shrinkwrap license after purchase. ProCD,
86 F.3d at 1452-53. Most courts have adopted the reasoning in ProCD. See Bowers v.
Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro,
Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638-
39 (8th Cir. 2005). There have, however, been some notable exceptions. See Kiocek v.
Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340-41 (D. Kan. 2000); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter
& Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006).
29. Furthermore, the existence of regulatory agencies themselves attests to another
possible consequence, which is the creation of additional agencies to deal with specific prob-
lems caused by the failure of contract law-and the judiciary-to address abuses. The
Federal Trade Commission resulted from the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
41-58, which was a legislative response, in part, to contracts restraining trade and competi-
tion. See generally Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation,
Control and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 1 (2003). The Consumer Financial Protection
Board was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, in response to banking practices, typically
implemented through contracts.
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begun study of the use of these clauses in connection with con-
sumer financial products or services.3
There is a synergy of sorts that plays out between and among
the judiciary, the legislature, and regulatory bodies. Judicial inac-
tion or complicity in the face of contractual abuse encourages ac-
tion by regulators and legislators, which eventually diminishes
the purview of contract law. Consequently, the future of contracts
and contract law will, to a large extent, depend upon the interplay
of marketplace changes and the judicial response to those chang-
es. The next section explains how this might look in 2025.
II. THE MARKETPLACE IN 2025 AND THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS
In this section, I will offer my predictions for what marketplace
changes to expect in 2025. These predictions do not require a
crystal ball as they merely extrapolate from existing trends. The
first is that software or digital technology will become incorpo-
rated into more consumer goods and to a greater extent as society
continues moving toward a norm of pervasive or ubiquitous com-
puting and augmented reality. The "Internet of Things" refers to
the concept where everyday products are seamlessly integrated
with networked devices embedded with microprocessors. In the
future, many more "things" will use electronic technology and will
use it more extensively. While many cars currently have global
positioning systems (GPS) and sensors to alert drivers to obsta-
cles, future cars will use technology to gather and employ data
based upon usage and to handle some or all of the driving. Con-
sumers will monitor and control their homes from another country
as easily as they now switch channels using a remote from their
living room couch. A "smart" house today can turn on the lights
and turn up the heat minutes before you get home, and track wa-
ter and energy usage to help you conserve energy and save money.
In the near future, however, houses may be able to capture much
more data, some of it more personal than the amount of energy
consumed. This information might include the number of people
who enter your home, the duration of your shower, how often you
30. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act) mandates that the CFPB conduct the study and gives it the power to issue regulations
on the use of arbitration clauses if doing so is in the public interest and for the protection of
consumers. CFPB Finds Few Consumers File Arbitration Cases, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/the-cfpb-finds-few-consumers-file-
arbitration-cases/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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brush your teeth, how frequently you look in a mirror, and how
much time you spend in your bed (and with whom).
The information gathered by our networked everyday items
might be combined with information gleaned from other sources.
At the time of the writing of this essay, Google recently announced
its $3.2 billion acquisition of Nest, a company that makes stylish
thermostats and smoke and carbon monoxide detectors which use
sensors and algorithms to track and influence user behavior."
Google could obtain a clearer, more intimate picture of its users by
combining information obtained from online Google sources
(Google Plus, Gmail, and Google Search) with data obtained from
Nest thermostats and smoke detectors. Furthermore, by combin-
ing that information with data collected from its driverless cars
and wearable computing devices, it could obtain an alarmingly
comprehensive picture of your daily activities as well as the activi-
ties of those who live, work, and socialize with you. Companies
like Google can use that information to make inferences about
their customers-such as their religious beliefs, sexual orienta-
tion, and political affiliation-and try to influence their behavior.
Some companies currently do just that. Pandora, Netflix, and
Amazon, for example, all have developed algorithms based upon
customers' preferences, profiles or past usage that enable these
companies to recommend tailored products and services.3 2 The
difference will be that in the future the extent and type of infor-
mation will mean that their inferences may be more accurate,
more revealing, and their ability to manipulate consumer behavior
more successful.
In the near future, we, too, will be altered and enhanced ver-
sions of our present selves. The term "augmented reality" general-
ly refers to enhancing human senses with computer generated
technology and making real world experiences digitally manipula-
ble. In this brave new world, people will not carry their devices,
they will be their devices. Even now, embedded chips can restore
31. Claire Cain Miller, For Google, a Toehold Into Goods for a Home, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/technology/google-to-buy-nest-labs-for-3-2-
billion.html.
32. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Listen to Pandora, and It Listens Back, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
4, 2014), http//www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/technology/pandora-mines-users-data-to-
better-target-ads.html ("People's music, movie or book choices may reveal much more than
commercial likes and dislikes. Certain product or cultural preferences can give glimpses
into consumers' political beliefs, religious faith, sexual orientation or other intimate issues.
That means many organizations now are not merely collecting details about where we go
and what we buy, but are also making inferences about who we are.").
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hearing, track the location of lost pets and regulate the beating of
the human heart. The Internet of Things will include networking
the thing called the human body. Google has already garnered
much attention for Google Glass, a wearable computer device that
looks like glasses." It also recently announced that it is working
to develop contact lenses that, with a wireless chip and sensors,
will measure glucose levels. 34 While technology may result in bet-
ter health care, what happens to the data collected from those mi-
crochips embedded in your body? Who will control what you see
and how you see it? Who owns the data gathered from our future
cyborg selves? Who can use it? And who is responsible when the
system breaks down-the user, the manufacturer of the product,
or the various third parties that install, integrate, implement or
upgrade portions of the system? What happens if the network is
hacked3 ' and all the faucets in your home are remotely turned on,
flooding the interior?
While technology holds great promise for enhancing daily life
and advancing society and the economy, it also poses great chal-
lenges and raises unanswered questions. Can marketers use in-
formation obtained through these smart devices (that you take
long showers, use scented creams, or cheat on your spouse) to sell
you things? The technology to collect this information will be
available before legislation exists to govern its use. What about
the information collected about third parties who have had their
picture taken, their movements monitored, and their preferences
recorded simply by being around you and your networked things?
In this legal "no man's land," businesses (and their lawyers) must
confront the many unanswered questions raised by new technolo-
gies. Without established laws, precedent or norms to govern be-
havior, businesses will turn to private ordering to set their own
rules. The boundaries of the law are blurred when it comes to new
technologies but contracting makes them clearer-and gives com-
panies an advantage when it comes to putting down stakes re-
garding the acceptability of certain practices.
As they have in the past, businesses will use contracts to legiti-
mize dubious new business practices, which may, over time, be-
33. What it Does - Google Glass, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/glass/start/what-it-
does (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
34. Introducing our smart contact lens project, GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/introducing-our-smart-contact-lens.html.
35. "Hack" is defined as "to gain access to a computer illegally." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 520 (10th ed. 2001).
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come accepted norms. Software companies, for example, use con-
tracts to limit their liability for failures so that even though Mi-
crosoft is a multi-billion dollar company, it is not liable when a
system crash causes a company to lose business or a consumer to
lose important files. They also use contracts to legitimize privacy-
invasive tracking practices. Most of the existing laws, and those
currently being proposed, allow companies to obtain consumers'
consent in order to establish authorization to otherwise illegal
monitoring or use of information.3 6 By shaping contract doctrine
in a way that makes consent easy to establish, courts defeat the
protections expected of this legislation. A recent Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO)" Report on consumer privacy states that
"consumers often were not aware of, and had not always consented
to, personal information being repurposed for marketing and other
uses."38
Given recent history in the area of online privacy and data col-
lection, and absent any regulation, businesses will likely continue
to collect and use this information before consumers are even
aware of it. Companies, finding it undesirable to discard poten-
tially valuable data, will likely include limitations of liability and
waiver clauses in their contracts, which effectively insulate them
from responsibility for their products and services. They may also
include provisions that expressly permit repurposing of data, re-
quire consumers to warrant the data collected and require con-
sumers to indemnify companies against third party-claims of mis-
appropriation or misuse. Businesses will use contracts to set the
boundaries of acceptable business practices regarding information
use, ownership and liability by having the consumer "consent" to
these oppressive terms in an unobtrusive contract when the con-
sumer signs up for the networked home service or purchases a
"smart" house.
36. Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual
Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1563 (2006) (noting that con-
sent is a defense to federal laws governing privacy).
37. The GAO is an "independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress" whose
mission is "to "help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal
government for the benefit of the American people . . . with timely information that is ob-
jective, fact-based, non-partisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced."). See About GAO, U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/aboutlindex.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2014).
38. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-663, INFORMATION RESELLERS:
CONSUMER PRIVACY FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY AND THE
MARKETPLACE 35 (Sept. 2013), available at http//www.gao.gov/assets/660/658151.pdf.
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Consumer habituation to ubiquitous contracts, the overwhelm-
ing volume of terms, and cognitive limitations mean that consum-
ers will be even less likely to read contracts and identify trouble-
some terms. Present-bias," optimism bias,40 and other heuristic
biases will continue to exist in 2025. Exacerbating the natural
tendency of human beings to avoid reading fine print, terms are
frequently updated to reflect constantly changing business prac-
tices which increases both the burden on consumers of reading
terms and the likelihood that businesses will continuously modify
terms in their favor. For example, Nest's current terms of use re-
stricts how the company uses information obtained through its
products. But the company reserves the right to modify its terms
of service:
Nest reserves the right to make changes to these Terms. You
should ensure that you have read and agree with our most re-
cent terms of service when you use the Services. Continued
use of the Services following notice of such changes shall indi-
cate your acknowledgment of such changes and agreement to
be bound by the terms and conditions of such change."
As Nest matures as a company, it is highly likely that it will
modify its terms of use to allow greater exploitation of data col-
lected 4 2 just as other companies have done, most notably Facebook
and Google. 3
39. "Present-bias" refers to a focus on the short term rather than the future or long-
term. See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing it Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
103 (Mar. 1999); see also BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 22 (noting
that myopia is common in consumers who prefer "immediate benefits even at the expense of
future costs.").
40. "Optimism bias" refers to an overestimation of the potential benefits and an under-
estimation of the risks of an activity. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict
Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in CHOICE, VALUES AND FRAMES 86 (Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2000) (noting a "common tendency of
people to overestimate their ability to predict and control future outcomes."). Id. at 476.
41. Terms of Service, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/terms/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
42. See also Miller, supra note 31 (quoting analyst Danny Sullivan as saying that
"Google likes to know everything they can about us, so I suppose devices that are monitor-
ing what's going on in our homes is another excellent way for them to gather that infor-
mation .... The more they're tied into our everyday life, the more they feel they can deliv-
er products we'll like and ads.").
43. See Kurt Opsahl, Facebook's Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline (showing
how Facebook's privacy policies have eroded user's control over their information over
time). Google recently announced updated Terms of Service that would permit it to use
information about users in paid advertisements. See Google Terms of Service,
GOOGLE POLICIES & PRINCIPLES (Nov. 11,
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Companies' attempts to fill the legal gap created by technologi-
cal innovations go beyond privacy into areas such as employment
and criminal law. What happens when your networked "smart"
car, which monitors how quickly you are driving, whether you
braked, and whether you were listening to music, eating or glance
in your rearview mirror, collides with another?44 It is currently
unclear who can access the data contained in your car's black box.
But if your insurance company inserts a clause in your insurance
policy which gives it the right to access the data, your "consent"
legitimizes its access and settles the matter-at least until one of
two things happens: a court refuses to enforce the contract, or a
law is passed prohibiting the practice.
The trend of current cases indicates that the former is unlikely
to happen anytime soon. On the contrary, the attenuated notion
of consent in wrap contract cases requires only "constructive no-
tice" and a subsequent failure to reject or immediately terminate
the transaction. This leads to some predictable behavior by oppor-
tunistic contract drafters. Some employers have recently started
to remotely delete all information on departing employees' per-
sonal devices which are networked to the company's system, in-
cluding non-company related, personal information such as family
photos, music and email programs.45 Some of these companies
engage in "phone wiping" even when the phone belongs to the em-
ployee and was purchased with the employee's money. This prac-
tice falls into the gap created when technology surpasses the law.
Not surprisingly, companies have resorted to contracts to fill the
gap, using wrap contracts to get employees to click "agree" to
phone wiping practices.46 The act of clicking constitutes a mani-
2013). httpI/www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/update/; Summary of Changes,
GOOGLE POLICIES & PRINCIPLES (Nov. 11, 2013)
http://www.google.com/intllen/policies/terms/changes/; see also Claire Cain Miller & Vindu
Goel, Google to Sell Users'Endorsements, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/technology/google-sets-plan-to-sell-users-
endorsements.html.
44. See Jaclyn Trop, The Next Data Privacy Battle May Be Waged Inside Your Car, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/the-next-privacy-
battle-may-be-waged-inside-your-car.html (reporting that a device commonly called a
"black box" collects information like direction, speed and seat belt use and is in nearly every
car today and may soon be mandatory).
45. Lauren Weber, Leaving a Job? Better Watch Your Cellphone, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22,
2014, at B7.
46. Id. ("Many employers have a pro forma user agreement that pops up when employ-
ees connect to an email or network server via a persona device . . . but even if these docu-
ments explicitly state that the company may perform remote wipes, workers often don't
take the time to read it before clicking the 'I agree' button").
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festation of assent, even though the employee is not actually
aware of the practice.47
As they have in the past, businesses will present consumers
with new contractual forms and courts will ponder new questions
regarding consent. Courts play an important role in the develop-
ment of business practices. Rather than watering down the
standard of notice and consent required for contract formation,
judges could apply a standard that reflects contracting realities
from the consumer's standpoint. They could require that busi-
nesses do more to make these new business practices salient
through heightened notice or specific assent requirements. Con-
sumers' subsequent actions would more closely reflect their ac-
ceptance or rejection of these new practices. Rather than becom-
ing normalized through inattention or lack of awareness, the
growth or obsolescence of these practices would reflect consumer
desires and enhance market efficiency.
Courts can also shape the development of business practices
through the use of policing doctrines such as unconscionability
and duress.48 They can strike down certain practices and force
companies to modify them (or motivate legislators to expressly
permit them). Courts can also do the converse. They can define
assent in a way that fails to reflect norms of reasonable human
behavior. They can promote business interests in the name of effi-
ciency and ignore the relationship between efficiency and in-
formed decision-making. They can refuse to acknowledge market
failures and disregard doctrinal defenses like unconscionability
and duress. They can ignore contractual abuse and pretend that
when they do so, they are merely being impartial and respecting
"freedom to contract." 49
My focus so far has been on the legal disruption created by new
technologies and the effect on consumers and consumer contracts,
but new technologies have also changed the way companies inter-
act and contract with each other. Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel,
47. Id. One former employee stated that after he was terminated, the phone he pur-
chased went blank and that "[hle has no memory of signing a release or user agreement,
though he concedes that a dialogue box may have appeared when he first connected to [the
company's] server 'and like everyone else, I was like, 'OK, check.'"
48. See Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic Contracts, 89
CHI. KENT L. REV. 265 (2014) (proposing that a doctrine of "situational duress" apply in
certain electronic contracting situations).
49. As the court in the landmark case of Henningsen noted, "freedom of contract is not
such an immutable doctrine as to admit of no qualification in the area of which we are
concerned." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960).
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and Robert Scott report that companies are moving away from
"vertical integration," where one company owns its suppliers.o By
controlling its supply chain, the company is able to avoid the
"hold-up" game where one of its suppliers engages in opportunistic
behavior. By contrast, they observe "vertical disintegration" in a
number of industries where firms engage in "a process of iterative
collaboration and co-design of both the interface and the compo-
nents it joins."" Rather than one firm controlling all aspects of its
supply chain, it engages with other firms that specialize in a par-
ticular aspect of production. Yet, the rapid pace of innovation
means that any firm along the chain may alter or reconfigure
what it produces. Because the firms in the chain depend upon
each other to maintain compatibility of products and retain mar-
ket relevance, each must engage cooperatively in the event of
chain disruptions. Gilson, Sabel, and Scott argue that "the verti-
cal disintegration of the supply chain observed in many industries
is mediated neither by fully specified explicit contracts . . . nor by
entirely implicit relational contracts supported only by norms of
reciprocity and the expectation of future dealings."5 2 Rather, they
have identified a new form of contracting which they refer to as
"contracting for innovation" which "supports iterative collabora-
tion between firms by interweaving explicit and implicit terms
that respond to the uncertainty inherent in the innovation pro-
cess."53
Many United States firms have overseas suppliers. Apple, for
example, has at least two hundred suppliers, most of whom are
based outside of the United States.54 As more United States firms
engage overseas companies to handle various stages of production,
the potential for changes from original plans-and the correspond-
ing need for flexibility-increases. Political upheavals, factory
accidents, new laws and regulations and even cultural misunder-
standings may cause delays or require changes in production or
distribution. While some parties may engage in opportunistic be-
havior without stringent contract terms to keep them in check,
50. Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation:
Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 434 (2009)
("Despite conventional industrial organization theory, however, contemporary practice is
moving away from vertical integration.").
51. Id. at 434.
52. Id. at 435.
53. Id.
54. Supplier Responsibility, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/our-
suppliers.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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interdependency and reputational concerns will likely regulate
and control bad faith behavior. A contract is a weak mechanism
for controlling behavior where the likelihood of enforcement is low.
Companies may find contracts useful for outlining shared goals
and expectations but other, extralegal mechanisms-such as trade
organizations or pressure from other businesses-may be more
effective at reigning in uncooperative actors. Business lawyers,
anticipating the need for flexibility, will create contracts that ena-
ble companies to maneuver and accommodate innovation while
still providing a modicum of assurance and a means by which to
rein in opportunistic behavior.
III. TWO ALTERNATE VISIONS OF CONTRACT LAW
The overarching purpose of contract law is not to improve the ef-
ficiency of transactions or redistribute wealth-it is to enforce the
intent of the parties and protect their reasonable expectations.
Other considerations-efficiency, fairness, and redistribution-
pertain to the reasonableness inquiry. Contract law fails when it
disregards parties' intent and their reasonable expectations.
When contract law fails, other law must fill the gap.
Contract law is failing in the area of consumer contracts, leav-
ing this area ripe for regulatory and legislative action. Consumers
are being held to contracts to which they did not intend to agree.
This is especially true with wrap contracts, which are both ubiqui-
tous and unobtrusive, and therefore, often ignored. Consumers do
not reasonably expect to be bound by contracts they did not actual-
ly see much less read. Not surprisingly, we are already seeing sec-
tor specific regulations of consumer contracts in certain areas,
most notably banking but also increasingly, privacy. If courts fail
to adopt a more equitable approach to consumer contracts-one
that reflects reality-then other regulation will certainly follow.
The role of the courts and contract law will shrink accordingly and
consumer contracts as a category will grow increasingly more
segmented and subject to different legal rules and regulatory re-
gimes.
By contrast, the behaviors and needs of parties in sophisticated
commercial transactions differ from those of parties in mass con-
sumer transactions. Contracts between two sophisticated com-
mercial entities typically do reflect their intentions and courts
should defer to the contract and to the extralegal channels ap-
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proved by the parties.s" Even in business-to-business transac-
tions, contracts play different roles. Contracts may be more aspi-
rational than regulatory in some business relationships but not
others. They may be viewed as works-in-progress in some trans-
actions but not others. They may be customized and heavily nego-
tiated or they may be standardized and unread. Contract law in
2025 should recognize the different roles contracts play depending
upon the nature of the transaction or relationship.
A judiciary that applies rules without context ignores the intent
of the parties-and so loses sight of contract law's purpose. Com-
mercial actors may seek alternative forms of dispute resolution,
essentially "opting-out" of contract law. Meanwhile, legislators
and regulators may seek to right contractual wrongs ignored by
the judiciary. Consumer protection laws will step in where courts
fear to tread. As in the past, contract law's domain may then be
carved into subspecialties, such as employment or insurance law,5
or overrun by other areas of the law such as property, privacy, or
tort." Under this vision, contract law in 2025 is diminished and
meager, muscled out in the consumer arena by other laws and
shunned in the business-to-business environment by commercial
entities mistrustful of what courts may do.
But there is a more promising, alternate vision of contract law.
Under this vision, contract law responds to the needs of contract-
ing parties in a flexible manner that recognizes marketplace needs
and realities. The judges who administer the law realize that a
mass consumer contract is not the same as a negotiated commer-
cial agreement. They understand that a contract has different
functions in different transactions and that a contract's role, and
the application of doctrinal standards, may shift depending upon
the type of transaction and the parties involved. Under this vi-
55. As Gilson, Sabel and Scott write: "[Clourts must follow the instructions of the con-
tracting parties as to how their contract is to be adapted to its particular context . . . in
responding to contract innovation driven by changes in the contracting parties' business
environment, courts must practice the passive virtues: The parties, not the courts, drive
innovation." Robert J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innova-
tion: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88
N.Y.U. L. REv. 170, 174 (2013).
56. Lawrence Friedman first made this observation when he noted that "[tihe most
dramatic changes touching the significance of contract law in modem life also came about,
not through internal developments in contract law, but through developments in public
policy which systematically robbed contracts of its subject-matter." LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN,
CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 24 (1965).
57. Grant Gilmore famously pronounced that contract law was "dead" and its rules
reabsorbed into tort. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95 (1974).
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sion, the judiciary takes advantage of the adaptability of contract
law to fulfill its promise-to promote the intent of the parties and
protect their reasonable expectations.
CONCLUSION
While society's definition of a contract-as a legally enforceable
promise-may not have changed much, the delivery mechanisms,
the methods of contracting, the role of the contract, and the appli-
cation of the doctrine itself have changed. Contracts-and con-
tract law-will continue to evolve as drafting parties invent new
ways to meet the needs of a changing marketplace. Courts will
evaluate new contracting forms, assess their enforceability, and
establish their limits. In doing so, courts should be guided by the
function of the contract and the context of the transaction. The
strength of contract law lies in its dynamism and adaptability.
The development of the law is not predetermined or inevitable;
judges shape its direction and guide its path. The future of con-
tract law then-its relevance and its vitality-depends upon the
wisdom of the courts.
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